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Abstract 
 
There is some evidence that companies, both multinational and African, operating from 
motivations that can be very broadly labelled "Corporate Social Responsibility", can make 
real and significant contributions to pastoral development and that useful development 
dialogues can be held with them.  But three case studies, from Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Senegal, also suggest that companies operating in "CSR" mode show a systemic tendency 
to attempt to teach proper engagement with markets, and remarkably little readiness to learn 
how pastoralists and other livestock-keepers wish to engage with markets, and what 
constrains them from doing so.  When allied with the intrinsic complexity of livestock-
keepers' objectives and constraints in production and marketing, this tendency to teach 
rather than learn severely limits the potential development contribution of CSR. 
 
 
‘RESPONSIBLE COMPANIES’ AND AFRICAN LIVESTOCK-KEEPERS: 
ACTING, TEACHING BUT NOT LEARNING?1 
 
DRAFT 
 
Introduction 
 
Much work in pastoral development in recent years has been around increasing pastoralist 
voice or representation and improving dialogues between pastoralists and other 
stakeholders in pastoral development: with the state at central and local levels, with NGOs 
and civil society, and with researchers.  There has however been a relative absence of work 
that seeks to link pastoralists with the private sector, and increase private sector 
engagement in pastoral development.  This is surprising for two reasons. 
 
Firstly, if there has been any doubt, it is now clear that pastoralists are not “subsistence 
producers”, nor are they “isolated” from national and global trade (McPeak, Little and 
Demment 2006).  The livestock trade has been an important feature of most pastoral 
societies in Africa for centuries (Kerven 1992), during which many factors, including the 
policies of colonial and post-colonial governments, have shaped it.   
 
At the same time, pastoralists increasingly use purchased inputs for livestock production, 
most notably but not solely veterinary drugs, and are consumers of many goods and 
services purchased from the market.  In a globalizing world, they are increasingly involved in 
global value chains involving the corporate private sector.  Given all this, the lack of a body 
of understanding and practical experience on relations between pastoralists and the private 
sector is increasingly problematic. 
 
Secondly, “Corporate Social Responsibility” (CSR), a concept that evolved in the context of 
the “developed countries”, has become an important idea in the programmes of development 
agencies and in debates on development.  Jenkins (2005) cites several examples of CSR 
being incorporated in to development agency practice and rhetoric, including a quote from 
the UK Department for International Development: “by following socially responsible 
practices, the growth generated by the private sector will be more inclusive, equitable and 
poverty reducing” (DFID n.d. cited in Jenkins 2005).  This is not to say that the idea of CSR 
in development is uncontested - Jenkins himself not only questions such claims, but also 
points that many international NGOs question them. 
 
This paper examines three case studies of the private sector involving itself in the 
development of pastoralism and related livelihoods in Africa.  In two of the cases there was 
decisive and effective action at scale by private-sector actors, and these cases clearly make 
the argument for expanded dialogue with the private sector by NGOs, CSOs, development 
donors and researchers.  However the case studies also highlight more problematic 
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tendencies of the private sector: to resist learning about pastoralism and pastoral rationality; 
to assume that the rationality of corporations can be relied on to design interventions in 
pastoral development; and to assume that pastoralists can and should be trained in that 
corporate rationality. 
 
The three case studies have different origins and different foci.  Two are drawn from my own 
work and that of close colleagues, a third from the published literature (Vatin 1996).2  Two of 
the cases, from Ethiopia and Senegal, concern pastoralists in a classic sense, a third from 
Uganda deals with corporate behaviour in the context of an extensive mixed crop-livestock 
system3, which as we shall see shares many aspects of complexity and uncertainty with 
pastoral systems.  The Senegalese and Ugandan cases involve multi-national companies 
whereas the Ethiopian case-study concerns small (though formally-registered) indigenous 
firms.  The Ethiopian example stems from a research project that was expressly intended to 
explore the issues of CSR in a pastoral development context, while the Ugandan case-study 
arose as part of a project aimed at learning lessons from the translation of research findings 
(in this case on the microbiology of trypanosomiasis and the behaviour of its insect vector 
the tsetse fly) into development action: private sector companies were only some of the 
actors involved.4  The theme of the private sector teaching but not learning was not originally 
a hypothesis of any of these enquiries, but emerged independently in each of the case 
studies I was involved in and in my reading of Vatin‟s work. 
 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility in Development  
 
Before going on to the three case studies, I will set the scene in a bit more detail by 
surveying some of the ways that CSR has been discussed and analysed in a development 
context. 
 
CSR is an evolving and contested concept. This is the case for business within developing 
countries and still more so in developing countries.  One common definition in a 
development context is that used by the World Bank (Petkoski and Twose 2003):  
 
“Corporate social responsibility is the commitment of business to contribute to 
sustainable economic development- working with employees, their families, the local 
community and society at large to improve the quality of life, in ways that are both 
good for business and good for development”  
 
This definition stresses the essentially voluntaristic nature of CSR – it is a “commitment” by 
business, rather than a compliance by business to external rules – and also stresses what 
has become known as the “business case” for CSR, that CSR benefits individuals 
companies in the medium- or long-term.  Making either element central to a definition of 
CSR has been contested (Blowfield and Frynas 2005). 
 
Blowfield and Frynas (2005:503) also point to the ambiguity about whether the term is 
applied to corporate practice, as the World Bank definition implies, or to a research agenda 
about broader business-society relationships.  Their broader definition is: 
 
An umbrella term for a variety of theories and practices all of which recognize the 
following: (a) that companies have a responsibility for their impact on society and the 
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natural environment, sometimes beyond legal compliance and the liability of 
individuals; (b) that companies have a responsibility for the behaviour of others with 
who they do business (e.g. within supply chains); and (c) that business needs to 
manage its relationship wider society, whether for reasons of commercial viability or 
to add value to society. 
 
Note here that the case for CSR can be based on either commercial viability or wider values, 
whereas the World Bank assumes both are always in play. 
 
Blowfield and Frynas also note that discussion of CSR in a specifically developing-country 
context is a relative latecomer to the field as a whole. When empirical research began on the 
impacts of CSR in developing countries, “certain conventions and orthodoxies had already 
been established”, voluntarism and the business case stayed centre-stage, and broader 
questions about the scope and nature of CSR were not asked.  Jenkins (2005) also notes 
some of the implicit exclusions from CSR discussions: transfer pricing, tax avoidance and 
broader questions of the poverty impact of business. 
 
Work on CSR in developing countries continues to grow, and some important critical surveys 
have been made (Blowfield and Frynas 2005, Blowfield 2005, Prieto-Carron et al. 2006).  
But empirically, this work still largely focuses on the work of northern companies in 
developing countries, or on CSR among indigenous companies in the larger “emerging 
economies” (Frynas 2006), with less on how it might be understood and played out by 
indigenous firms in smaller, poorer economies.  This is unfortunate both because these firms 
may well view and act on CSR very differently and because indigenous corporate sectors 
can be, collectively, economically important.  It is also unfortunate because there is a need 
to look at the importance of socio-cultural context of CSR.  Blowfield and Frynas (2005) 
suggest that the publicity given to CSR in the Anglo-Saxon countries stems from cultural 
distinctions between the economic and the social, and that other societies may accept the 
social obligations of business as more natural and thus less noteworthy.  Although there has 
been some research on the differing socio-cultural contexts even in a European context 
(Albareda et al 2007), this study is just beginning in developing countries. 
 
Our own work in Ethiopia was intended to be inclusive in its approach, not to assume that 
“CSR” was a concept familiar to Ethiopian companies, or that if it was it necessarily indicated  
the same thing as in the North.  Rather we tried to capture a range of perceptions and 
behaviour by Ethiopian companies that might loosely translate as CSR.  For example, we 
were also careful to note examples of companies displaying “philanthropy” towards pastoral 
causes, such as corporate donations to fund-raising events.   Recent writing on CSR and 
development has sometimes tended to exclude philanthropy, often defined as donations 
made post-profit (Jenkins 2005), or activities “not related to the core business strategies of 
companies” (Prieto-Carron et al. 2006).  Prieto-Carron et al. implicitly exclude Indian 
companies engaging in philanthropy from those having a “policy or a formal programme on 
CSR”.  By contrast, we felt it would be privileging culturally-specific views of CSR and 
limiting the understanding achieved by the study, if we did likewise. 
 
Discussions of CSR in development raise the question of “the business case” for CSR.  This 
idea has come under critique from various quarters: that it privileges the fundamental values 
of business, brackets out from discussion a whole raft of questions about the role (or not) of 
business in poverty reduction, with “downgraded expectations of what the actions of 
business should contribute to society” (Blowfield 2005: 524); that CSR activities based on 
the business case may simply not work (Blowfield and Murray 2008); and that there is no 
single or uniform business case, but a range from a long-term strategic business case to 
short-term defensive business cases (Zadek 2001, Fox 2004).   
 
The case-studies here vary greatly in the ways in which CSR was conceived in terms of a 
business case. In Ethiopia companies were very much looking at their own advantages in 
terms of more predictable flows of livestock to the export trade, and a better reputation for 
Ethiopian meat in general in the export markets.  In Senegal there is a suggestion that the 
project described was partially a defensive measure by Nestlé against bad publicity in other 
parts of its business.  In Uganda the main corporate actor, Industri Kapital, was operating by 
the end of the project in philanthropic mode, having divested itself of the relevant 
businesses.  The business case is an important, and rightly contested, issue for CSR in 
development, but the problem of teaching and learning described in this paper cuts across it. 
 
 
Ethiopia: complexities of responsibility 
 
This case-study is based on interviews with four meat export companies and six livestock 
export companies (out of five and twelve companies respectively then operating) carried out 
in Addis Ababa and Debre Zeit in 2007, and remarks made by company representatives in 
two workshops.  The companies were all Ethiopian-owned, and all but one were small, sole-
owned or family businesses.  However, these companies are formally registered: we are not 
dealing here with “the informal sector”. 
 
The international meat and livestock trade is central to Ethiopian pastoralism, as well as 
providing two of the country‟s largest exports.  Different government sources place 2002/03 
national official livestock exports at $US606,437 and meat exports at $US2,896,782.  The 
pastoralist population is variously estimated at around 7 million people, or 10-12 % of the 
national population (Morton et al. 2004).  It is estimated that pastoralist-owned livestock 
account for 20% of the cattle population of the country, 25% of the sheep, 75% of the goats 
and almost 100% of the camels.  However, they account for the great majority of the 
country‟s official meat and livestock exports (Greenhalgh and Orchard 2005).  Pastoralists 
are also engaged in unofficial cross-border trades with Somaliland and Kenya, illegal or 
barely-tolerated, with volumes that dwarf official exports, but these are not further considered 
here. 
 
The main market for both value chains are the Gulf States, although there is also export to 
other Arab countries such as Egypt and Jordan, and other markets are being actively 
sought.  Ethiopian meat competes in these markets with meat from other East African 
countries, Australia, South America and India. The Arab markets (see Belachew and 
Hargreaves 2003) are characterised by personal relations between exporters and buyers, 
but also by the somewhat unpredictable, many would say arbitrary, impositions of live animal 
export bans based on animal health concerns, in particular the bans by the Gulf states, 
recurrently since the late 1990s, based on the supposed risk of Rift Valley Fever among 
Ethiopian livestock. 
 
Government policy favours meat export over live animal export as it the former is thought to 
add value in-country and to create employment.  It also enjoys a generalised aura of being a 
more “modern” sector of the economy.  However, the meat export sector suffers from more 
of the constraints outlined above, and apply forcefully.  The meat export sector is therefore 
currently characterised by an extreme underutilisation of existing abattoir capacity: it is 
estimated to operate at only 13-17% of available capacity (Foreman 2005).   The livestock 
sector, though smaller for the last years where records were easily available appears to be 
growing faster, with more new entrants.  As we shall see, the livestock exporters are at least 
arguably more likely to engage in “corporate responsibility” towards pastoral development. 
 
There have been several studies of livestock and meat marketing in pastoral areas of 
Ethiopia (Solomon et al. 2003, Saperstein and Farmer 2006, Umar 2007, Aklilu and Catley 
2009 among others ).  Value chains are clearly complex and distinguished by a range of 
actors, such as local traders and agents.  Terminology used by exporters and observers to 
describe those actors is not always standardised: terms like “middlemen” may mean different 
things to different people.  There is variation between value chains in different regions (co-
operatives and similar groups are much more common in Borena Zone than in Somali or 
Afar Regions).  Different exporters have different preferences for how they source livestock, 
but there is substantial overlap between the meat and formal livestock export trades, and 
some with the domestic livestock trade and with unofficial exports. 
 
Most of the meat and livestock exporters operate mixed strategies for purchasing, using their 
own salaried staff, small traders and brokers.  Both the meat and livestock exporters also 
use co-operatives and pastoral livestock marketing groups to some extent; such groups 
have sprung up in recent years, especially in Borena Zone (see Desta et al. 2006 and other 
refs).  Exporters have mixed feelings about these co-operatives and their future in the export 
trade is unclear. 
 
Attitudes to “Corporate Social Responsibility”  
 
The exporting companies were generally, and not altogether surprisingly, unfamiliar with the 
concept of CSR.  As the project explored perceptions and attitudes they held that might 
translate as CSR, these attitudes turned out to be complex and hard to summarise.  Some 
direct quotes from exporters5 will illustrate the complexity of the issues at stake: 
 “Business is not a charity” 
 “Creating an export market could be considered as social responsibility because the 
pastoralists benefit” 
 “Our real competitors are not each other, they are India, Sudan, Australia” 
 “As a company we have a responsibility: if the pastoralists do not survive, we do not 
survive”. 
 
These quotes show how within quite a small group, views range from a very orthodox view 
that business has no responsibilities, through views that by doing business the exporters 
benefit either pastoralists or the national economy, to a more nuanced view of the specific 
vulnerabilities of pastoralism, and consequent vulnerabilities of the sectors that depend on it.   
 
In practical terms, several exporters had made philanthropic donations (in the range of 
ETB10,000 to ETB100,000 per year) to educational and other causes in pastoral areas: thge 
largest company, and the one that seemed to do this the most, referred to it as “corporate 
citizenship”. Some companies had engaged in two closely related activities within this 
general field that could be labelled CSR: drought-time destocking, and educating pastoralists 
on the requirements of the livestock market.  Each of these is discussed in more detail 
below. 
 
While the concept of CSR was generally new to exporters, they seemed in the interviews 
and workshops to accept some overall connection between their business and the issue of 
pastoral development, and willing to enter into a dialogue about the relationship between 
their survival as businesses and their responsibilities towards pastoralists.  . 
 
However, both meat and livestock exporters felt that if they were to implement responsible 
practices, this would be easier through their respective trade associations than as individual 
companies.  They also took a strong view, reiterated forcefully by many of them both in 
interviews and in workshops that the livestock and meat industries were in an early stage of 
development, still dependent on government and donors for guidance and capacity-building.  
At this stage, government, not companies, needed to take the lead in pastoral development.  
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The livestock exporters had a specific angle on this, as they see government as favouring 
meat exporters in its general policy – one livestock exporter was vociferous in stating he had 
no reason to be concerned with pastoral development since the government has a 
discriminatory policy. The companies want government to take action on a number of 
pastoral development issues: improving animal health service delivery, providing livestock 
market infrastructure, providing businesses with soft credit.  In these suggestions they were 
very much in line with current international orthodoxy on pastoral development.  Some 
companies, however, supported further-reaching policies that are more controversial – 
sedentarisation of pastoralists and restructuring of land tenure in the direction of more fixed 
individual or small-group title.   
 
Drought  
 
The frequent droughts experienced in pastoral areas of Ethiopia have serious effects on the 
meat and livestock export companies, but also present an opportunity to examine the way 
these companies are engaging with pastoralists in ways that might be considered to show 
“corporate responsibility”.  As a generalisation, one of the most important responses of 
pastoralists to drought is to sell more livestock than usual.  However, during drought animals 
are likely to be in poorer condition, and prices are likely to be lower because of the glut on 
the market caused by large numbers of simultaneous distress sales.  The poor condition of 
animals also makes it more difficult for them to be trekked to markets or roads, and 
pastoralists are thus more dependent on livestock traders who come with their own 
transport.    In Ethiopia, there is good evidence that pastoralists wish to sell more animals 
during drought than they currently do.    
 
For meat-exporting companies (at least in Ethiopia), droughts affect the quality of meat and 
may disrupt supply and therefore long-term market share.  Drought also seriously affects live 
animal export through the declining condition of animals, and consequent need for extra 
fattening before they can be exported.  However the business impact for both groups is 
generally one of a reduction in profit rather than an actual loss.   
 
In Ethiopia and neighbouring countries, there have been attempts in recent years by NGOs 
and international donors to involve private companies in purchasing livestock during drought 
that would otherwise go unsold, a practice variously referred to as “destocking”, “commercial 
destocking” or “emergency livestock marketing interventions” (Morton 2006).6   During the 
2005-2006 drought in Southern Ethiopia these took the form (Abebe et al. 2008) of a) the 
organisation by the Livestock Marketing Department and Save the Children-US, a major 
international NGO of familiarisation tours of the rangelands for meat and live animal 
exporters, and b) availability of soft credit. 
 
From interviews and comments made in our workshops, it seems that Ethiopian meat export 
companies assisted pastoralists during drought by buying marginally more livestock than 
they would have done based only on short-term profits, temporarily overstocking their 
holding grounds to do so.  Two of the four companies interviewed told us they had bought 
2000 cattle and 2000 smallstock respectively in excess of their holding ground capacity.  Any 
additional buying has been limited by a) the lack of fattening facilities, and the fact that 
pastoralists, at least in the Borana area, are mainly concerned with selling cattle during 
drought, while the meat export companies deal mainly in smallstock carcasses.  
Representatives of the only large company in the sample7 told us that they had bought 
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additional stock during the 2006 drought that they had then sold into domestic meat markets, 
but this does not appear to have been the case for other companies. 
 
The livestock export companies by contrast became involved on a larger scale, with at least 
two companies buying 20,000 head of cattle.8   A thorough impact assessment has 
concluded on the basis of this experience that “commercial destocking is a viable and useful 
drought intervention” (Abebe et al. 2008).  Companies bought more animals than they would 
otherwise have done, bought from communities more distant from tarmac roads, and bought 
animals in worse condition.  It appears that the tours organised by SC-US, and continuing 
discussions between SC-US and the traders, were the triggers – loans were only taken after 
the purchasing was underway.  The companies most involved freely admit they were able to 
build their reputations among pastoralists to their long-term commercial advantage.  The 
manager of the most active company said “we did it to strengthen our relationships with the 
pastoralists: now everyone in Borana knows the name of [the company owner]”.  But it is 
clear from outside observers (such as the responsible officer at SC-US) that something more 
than even long-term commercial motives were involved.  
 
Training pastoralists for export markets  
 
Exporters also show a strong desire to influence the supply of livestock for sale by 
pastoralists, and change the lower levels of meat and livestock value chains.  In practice this 
has taken, and is likely to continue taking, two overlapping forms: hosting, in conjunction with 
development agencies, “study tours” of export abattoirs; and encouraging certain sorts of 
“well-performing” co-operatives.  
 
All four of the meat exporters we interviewed and one of the livestock exporters had been 
involved in hosting study tours of abattoirs and other locations associated with the export 
trade.  Participants were variously identified as “clan leaders”, “tribal elders”, leaders of co-
operatives or pastoral marketing groups or ordinary pastoralists.  These tours have been 
organised in recent years by several different aid programmes.  However, it is important to 
note that exporters saw their hosting of the tours as collaborating with the aid projects rather 
than being beneficiaries of them, of fitting into the category of “responsibility for pastoral 
development” we were exploring with them, and being of a piece with both destocking 
activities during drought and with philanthropic donations.  Exporters made small monetary 
outlays to host the pastoralists. 
 
Project reports and publications by those involved give a sense of the objectives and 
underlying assumptions of the tours.  ACDI-VOCA reports on tours in early 2006 under the 
Livestock Marketing Component of USAID‟s Pastoral Livelihood Initiative: 
 
 “Over the course of these trips and meetings, seller groups...obtained information on 
buyers’ requirements in terms of weight, sex, age and other parameters, and buyers 
were informed of the timing frequency and market days” (ACDI-VOCA:6)  
 
This is referred to as an “exchange of information” but the information imparted to 
pastoralists appear to have been fuller and more fundamental than the information obtained 
from them: the buyers‟ requirements structure the export trade, the timing of market days is 
a contingent detail. 
 
Similarly, Desta et al. (2006) write of earlier tours organised by the PARIMA programme, in 
which they were involved: 
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 Abebe et al. report two companies buying 20,000 head.  Our own interviews suggest five livestock export 
companies were involved – the two that gave us figures claimed purchases of 23,000 and 3,000 head. 
“The pastoral participants, overall, were selected based on their potential to serve as 
community mentors and role models to increase the chance they could pass 
knowledge on to others… the two tours allowed the pastoralists to better grasp what 
an export market network entails and exposed them to various events along a 
marketing chain from production and processing to final sale of a wide variety of 
products. The tour members learned about required quality, size (i.e. 6-10kg dressed 
carcass weight), and health criteria that export markets demand, associations 
between grading and pricing, and the growing demand for specific grades of small 
ruminants for export” (Desta et al. 2006: 114).  
 
While the article goes on to note that pastoralists also were able to express their concerns 
(distances to markets, their lack of marketing skills and market information, and their lack of 
capital), the language used (“mentors”, “pass on knowledge”) and the very specificity of the 
knowledge passed on (“6-10kg dressed carcass weight”) suggest a process where the 
balance of real communication was distinctly uni-directional. 
 
The representative of a professional association for exporters showed how pastoralist 
concerns could be bracketed out of such processes.  Pastoralists on such tours could raise 
their concerns – over veterinary services and general livestock development -  so these 
questions could be passed to government: the abattoir owners “just listened”. 
 
From our own interviews there were similarly revealing comments.  The manager of one 
export abattoir stated: “VOCA brought the pastoralists here – we gave them our 
specifications”.  In response to a question on whether he felt responsibility for pastoral 
development, one livestock exporter replied emphatically that he did.  Pastoralists, he said, 
do not want to sell old animals and replace them with younger animals in order to be 
“business-oriented”; he himself was prepared to contribute to the costs of communicating to 
them that they should do so. 
 
A related strand of thinking was the desire by exporters to intervene at the producer end of 
the value chains, to cut out middlemen and lower overall costs.  Exporters had concerns 
about collusion among lower-level traders and brokers, who they saw as “urban people” and 
external to pastoral communities, infiltrating and exerting undue influence over co-operatives 
and marketing groups.  Even where they did not share this diagnosis of outside influence, 
exporters saw the co-operatives as “weak” and slow”, and adopted a tone of disappointment 
over them.  A representative of the largest company said they “had not given up hope” of 
supporting pastoral livestock marketing groups, and were ready to help by increasing the 
flow of cash advances to co-operatives they judged to be strong. 
 
Overall, the Ethiopian study revealed a knot of cross-cutting attitudes of exporters to what 
might be called “corporate social responsibility”.  It cast further light on a real and significant 
exercise of that responsibility in the commercial destocking of 2006, but it also showed that 
this emerging sense of responsibility was caught up in a desire to mould pastoralist 
marketing behaviour, chiefly by educating them in market requirements for livestock.  What 
was significantly absent during all the interviews and workshops was any sense that the 
exporters themselves needed educating on pastoralists herd accumulation and offtake 
strategies: why pastoralists need to sell the animals they do at the times they do.  The 
assumed information deficit was entirely one way: pastoralists being ignorant of business.   
 
 
 
Senegal: a multinational lost in the bush 
 
In 1990-91 the well known Swiss dairy multinational, Nestlé, established a collection system 
for fresh milk based at Dahra, in a pastoralist area of Northern Senegal.  The experience of 
the first two seasons of this project is recounted and analysed at length by François Vatin.  
Vatin places Nestlé‟s initiative in the context of the company‟s global policy of “development 
partnership” with third-world countries, assisting them in gradually substituting domestic milk 
production for imports of milk powder.  He also characterises the initiative as “mécénat”, a 
French word meaning patronage or sponsorship, as in private patronage of the arts.  
“Industrial patronage is never totally disinterested, but its interest for the firm is indirect: 
brand image, establishment of relations of trust with certain partners, etc.  Here it was 
definitely a case of implanting a positive image of the company in matters of development, 
aimed firstly at the governments of third-world countries where it invested, and perhaps 
secondarily at broader international public opinion” (1996: 165).  In this connection Vatin 
notes the problems Nestlé had had with its international public image following controversies 
of marketing of baby milk formulas in the 1970s. 
 
The project involved the building by Nestlé of five refrigerated collection centres at locations 
on tarmac roads, whose ownership was then turned over to local communities.  Nestlé would 
buy milk in large quantities from these centres and transport it chilled to Dakar.  In addition, 
Nestlé would sell cattle-owners, at cost and on easy repayment terms, modern steel 
containers for milking and storing milk (the traditional calabashes were known to favour 
bacterial contamination) and high quality dairy feed (while groundnut cake was readily 
available, much of what was on the market was contaminated with aflatoxins: Nestlé could 
provide detoxified cake). 
 
While the aim was for year-round collection, it was accepted that most milk would be 
collected during the wet season, between September and January.  During the first such 
season 82,000 litres was collected from 689 producers.  In 1992 collection dropped by 
around 70%, and the number of producers dropped to 385.  This meant a very poor 
utilisation of the refrigerated lorry, in turn leading to an extremely high unit cost of getting 
Dahra milk to Dakar, and a negligible degree of achieving the long-term import substitution 
objective: milk from Dahra represented less than 1% of sales of reconstituted milk powder. 
 
Drought was undoubtedly a factor in the decline of milk sales in 1992, but Vatin sees it as a 
crisis that revealed some of the profound tensions and misunderstandings between Nestlé 
and the Fulani pastoralists. 
 
The Dahra region was one where pastoralists had long traditions both of selling milk directly 
to their farming neighbours and of using the railway network to sell curdled milk (lait caillé) 
and clarified butter.  Indeed, Livestock Department officials had argued at the beginning of 
the project that Nestlé would be better advised to work in more distant pastoral areas with 
poorer market access.  Nestlé was prepared to pay, presumably in the name of its 
“development partnership”, prices for milk in Dahra that resulted in prices at Dakar several 
times those for reconstituted milk powder (which were kept artificially low by European 
subsidies).  But it was still not prepared to pay prices which came near those prevailing in 
Dahra for fresh milk, lait caillé, and butter (taking fresh milk equivalents).  Some Nestlé staff 
rationalised this as a need to educate Fulani in the ways of the world market: 
 
“raising the price of milk above the current price (already higher than the international 
price) would amount to “deceiving” the Fulani, deluding them over the “real” value of 
their product.  In its “educational” concern, the company wishes to uphold a language 
of truth in establishing a “fair”, or in other words “realistic,” price in the context of the 
world market for milk.  (Vatin 1996:192 – my translation). 
 
But as Vatin points out, the low prices in reality derived from low demand in Dakar and 
competition from imported milk powder: they were artificial effects of support to producers in 
the west, trade negotiations and the vagaries of international food aid.  Other Nestlé staff 
rationalised the low prices as deliberately not encouraging Fulani to sell more than their 
residual milk after calf and human consumption needs had been met.  A proportion of the 
Fulani appeared loyal to Nestlé: they were attracted by Nestlé‟s guarantee that milk would 
be bought, and by the element of forced savings represented by fortnightly payments.  A 
majority clearly were not, and continued to sell into more traditional systems, achieving 
higher prices and probably putting less pressure on calf and family consumption. 
 
Nestlé had not factored into its plans the fact that much of the milk sold into traditional 
systems was sheep and goat milk, which Fulani prefer not to drink themselves.  Nestlé 
would not accept sheep and goat milk, but had basically failed to realise how small a 
marketable surplus of cows‟ milk there would be after it was used for calves and in its 
traditional role as a valued source of family food. 
 
Nestlé‟s idea that it could divest itself of all responsibility for getting milk to the collection 
centres, relying instead on “community cooperation”, proved to be illusory.  It provoked 
tensions between the company and the pastoral community, involving the constant 
renegotiation of responsibilities (generally in Nestlé‟s disfavour).  It also provoked tensions 
within the community between the women who traditionally milked animals and sold milk, 
and the men who were assumed to be suited to manage that cooperation and the recording 
and payment systems for milk marketing.  Attempts to sell high quality feed against 
deductions from milk sales ran into similar problems: women were positively opposed to 
seeing what they regarded as their money from milk sales used up in the male responsibility 
of feeding cattle.  
 
Finally, the company had not factored drought itself, which is recurrent in Northern Senegal 
as in other pastoral areas, sufficiently into its plans.  Not only did drought cause production 
to crash, but it also presented Nestlé with an acute dilemma over whether to continue to levy 
repayment for feed and equipment during the drought.  Not to do so would have been seen 
by the company as a retreat from the business principles it upheld towards a charitable role, 
which, however, it was finally forced to adopt with free distribution of concentrate. 
 
Vatin draws lessons from this story for sociological theory: that the case-study blurs Max 
Weber‟s distinction between “value rationality” and “means-end rationality”: in the end the 
supposedly “traditional” Fulani showed a readiness to search out the best price for their 
product, while the supposedly rational Nestlé found itself caught between its mission to bring 
development to the Fulani, its desire to enhance its image, and the demands of a complex 
and still very locally-segmented market.  For the current study, these lessons could be put in 
other ways.  Firstly, the drive for responsibility failed because of the international trade 
context, in this case subsidised imports of milk powder from Europe, a context Nestlé should 
have understood. Secondly, Nestlé‟s “patronage” failed to understand, or even to try to 
understand, pastoral society, its existing assets and adaptations, and the tensions within it.  
 
In more recent years, Nestlé has closed down its operations in Dahra and donated the 
remaining physical plant to the AfDB-funded, government-implemented PAPEL project.9  
The factory had never succeeded in offering pastoralists a better incentive than that offered 
under traditional systems (Alex Ickowicz, pers. comm.).  One question to be asked is why 
Nestlé spent over 10 years coming to this conclusion.  
 
                                                          
9
 It is not quite clear when this happened, but certainly post-2004. As of February 2007, Nestlé headquarters in 
Switzerland had had no contact with the factory “for several years” and were unable to provide any further 
information (Eduard Bruckner, pers.comm.). 
 
Uganda: creating new channels for veterinary drug supply10 
 
Southeast Uganda is an endemic zone for acute human sleeping sickness, a disease 
caused by the parasite Trypanosoma brucei rhodesiense, and transmitted by tsetse flies.  
Cattle populations in southeast Uganda form the major reservoir for T.b.rhodesiense, 
allowing it to persist and be transmitted to humans; the parasite is asymptomatic in cattle, 
but other species and sub-species of trypanosome, also transmitted by tsetse, cause the 
cattle disease nagana.  
 
Starting in 1998 there was an outbreak of acute sleeping sickness in Soroti, northwest of the 
traditional endemic zone.  National and international concern increased, not only because of 
the human suffering involved, but also as it was felt that there was a risk that acute sleeping 
sickness would spread further and “merge” with foci of chronic sleeping sickness, 
Trypanosoma brucei gambiense, in northwest Uganda, greatly complicating the work of 
correct diagnosis and drug treatment.   
 
Various strands of scientific research, carried out among others by the Faculty of Veterinary 
Medicine of Makerere University, the University of Edinburgh, and the Natural Resources 
Institute, provided possible solutions to the outbreak.  Modelling results showed that a mass 
synchronised treatment of cattle with injectable trypanocides, Veridium and VerebinB12, 
would clear the cattle reservoir of trypanosomes, while a recurrent programme of spraying 
(or painting) cattle with a pyrethroid insecticide would prevent reinfection by killing the tsetse 
fly.  Spraying would work at a population level rather than protecting individual cows or 
households and would require a high proportion of cattle owners to spray most of their cattle 
on a regular basis to be effective, potentially raising issues of farmer fatigue and problems of 
collective action.  On the other hand the same insecticides control ticks and tick-borne 
diseases, which are a major constraint on livestock production, and do so at the level of 
individual cows and in a visible way.  A suitable formulation for this task is an insecticide 
marketed as Vectocid. 
   
In 2006 the “Stamp Out Sleeping Sickness Campaign” was planned and agreed for five 
districts immediately northwest of Soroti: Kaberamaido, Dokolo, Amolatar, Lira and Apac.  
These districts, inhabited mainly by Teso and Lango people, are characterised by mixed 
farming, including cotton cultivation using draft cattle, cattle also being extensively grazed at 
some distance from villages.  The partners for the campaign were a coalition including the 
government of Uganda represented by the Co-ordinating Office for Control of 
Trypanosomiasis in Uganda (COCTU), Makerere and Edinburgh Universities, and two 
private companies.  One was the French-based multinational veterinary drug company 
Ceva, manufacturers of Veridium and Vectocid, the other was the Swedish-based private 
equity company Industri Kapital (IK), at that time the majority shareholder in Ceva.  Both saw 
their engagement as fitting within the umbrella of “corporate social responsibility”. 
 
IK saw itself as contributing more than funding by bringing private sector management 
expertise to the projects it funds.   Its representative has also emphasised that IK would not 
have been interested if only emergency intervention (without subsequent institution-building) 
had been planned, and that it had a strong interest in “education and training”.  
 
The chief Ceva executive involved describes its involvement at this stage as “pure altruism”, 
with an additional element of building their own staff morale, and points out that the company 
did not seek publicity.  Ceva saw the control of sleeping sickness in the new areas as 
something it could and should do.  It was keen to get government blessing for the initiative 
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through COCTU. However, as the project developed, Ceva grew more interested in 
exploring whether there was a market and in seeking a return “at some point”. 11   
 
The agreement was that Ceva and IK would donate stocks of Veridium, VerebinB12 and 
Vectocid, and significant funds for implementing and monitoring the programme.  Makerere 
would make final year veterinary students available for the trypanocidal treatment and the 
first rounds of spraying, which fitted well with a new teaching philosophy within the veterinary 
faculty.  Edinburgh would be responsible for monitoring trypanosome prevalence in the cattle 
population. 
 
The campaign achieved a major drop in trypanosome prevalence, but by late 2007 levels 
were increasing again.  The conclusion was drawn that cattle-owners needed to be 
encouraged to spray their own animals regularly, using the preferred formulation Vectocid, 
rather than relying on mass treatment campaigns.  Attempts up till then of spreading brand 
awareness of Vectocid had failed.  A second phase of the programme was therefore agreed 
by the same parties (except that IK had by now divested itself from Ceva, and now funded 
the operation essentially as philanthropy, through IKARE, a UK-registered charity set up to 
channel donations from IK‟s partners).  Alongside one further round of block mass treatment, 
five fresh veterinary graduates would be sponsored by IK to establish themselves in the 
programme areas, both to raise the awareness of cattle-owners on the importance of regular 
spraying, and specifically to build sustainable market channels for the sale to farmers of 
Vectocid.  They became known as the “3V Vets” after Veridium, VerebinB12 and Vectocid.  
 
The 3V Vets were employed (for convenience through HHS, the private company of a 
Makerere staff member) on a good salary of $US500/month, with a loan to purchase a 
motorcycle.  They were set up with initial stocks of the three products for sale, with guideline 
prices for wholesale and retail.  New stocks could be sent as required.  The cost element of 
proceeds from sales was to be recycled within the project, with the 3V Vets keeping the 
margin.  It is therefore easy to assume that the 3V Vets were from the beginning intended to 
become self-sustaining businessmen12, and given initial support while they built up their 
business, but the objectives in the eyes of those who established the programme were more 
multiple and complex.   
 
The contract for HHS gives a key objective: “to initiate and co-ordinate the establishment of 
a commercial logic for livestock owners to purchase [the three products and] to ensure the 
products are widely available at all key points in the SOS area”.  The job description for the 
3V Vets runs to almost two pages, with the headline items being: 
 Interaction with government and NGOs 
 Maintaining high visibility at main markets 
 Developing contact and sales through all local traders in agro-veterinary products 
 Community work (demonstrations of spraying with Vectocid and training of community 
sprayers) 
 Work with local media. 
 
For Ceva the main objective was to “fully test whether there was a viable market” for the 
insecticide.  The IK representative has stated that at the beginning there was “no clear 
vision”, but that the main tasks were “messaging and mapping”, mapping that is the complex 
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landscape of small businesses and NGOs that might act as channels for sales.13    For the 
3V Vets, interviewed in October 2008, the task they spent most time on was “sensitisation”.  
They saw themselves as fundamentally different from the existing drug shops, as “people 
educators” and “preachers of the gospel”.   The importance of mapping and sensitisation for 
the 3Vs can be seen in the pro-forma reports they wrote on their activities over May-July 
2008, detailing NGOs and government bodies contacted, weekly markets visited, and local 
media contacts.  Existing markets and drug outlets were also recorded using GPS and 
marked on maps of the area.   
 
By October 2008, the 3V vets identified various problems they faced: large areas to cover, 
lack of cooperation from local leaders, high expectations of handouts, fluctuating availability 
of the key drugs, rivalry with local traders, limited collaboration from the District Veterinary 
officers and lack of business training.  One interesting point is that nobody objected to the 
fact that they only sold the products of one drug company.  Rather there were some 
complaints that they did not sell drugs unrelated to trypanosomiasis control – antibiotics and 
antihelminthics. 
 
At this point they were passing messages to farmers about spraying more or less in 
accordance with research findings.  The 3Vs were doing some spraying themselves, for 
nominal payment, as a demonstration, but trying to train farmers in the longer term.  Some 
were making use of fliers, poster and brochures provided by the project.   
 
In October 2008, with all the work they were doing on “messaging” (a favourite campaign 
term), the margin they were making on drug sales by October 2008 was in the order of only 
10% of the amount they received as salary from HHS, something of which the 3Vs were 
aware.  They were however fundamentally optimistic over the quality of the product, farmers‟ 
reception of it, and their own future.  At that stage discussions were commencing with HHS, 
Ceva and IK about changes to the project that would enable them to set up as independent 
veterinary drug dealers. 
 
Evolving the Model14 
 
In late 2008, IK and Ceva came to commit themselves more fully to longer-term support and 
a vision of the 3Vs as self-sustaining businesses.  As we have seen, this had been until then 
a possible outcome of the initiative, but not a certain one.  One reason it materialised was 
the 3Vs themselves identifying untapped markets.  IK and Ceva agreed an initial extension 
of the salary until February.  They also agreed to reimburse the 3Vs for payments they 
needed to make to village and parish leaders to facilitate their work.  At around the same 
time, they initiated a scheme whereby the 3Vs would provide simple handpumps on interest 
free credit to farmers willing to be trained as sprayers.   These moves confirmed the view of 
the 3Vs and other stakeholders that IK and Ceva were keeping themselves well-informed 
about progress and obstacles, and responding with real flexibility. 
 
In early 2009, IK arranged for the 3Vs to receive basic business training from a trainer 
recruited from INSEAD (the internationally-renowned business school near Paris).  This 
person‟s African experience, in fact a single visit to Mozambique, was referred to later in 
presentations by IK. The training involved the 3Vs drafting individual business plans, which 
showed them breaking even within 12 months.   Following this, more far-reaching changes 
were effected.  
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 This section is based mainly on a group interview with the 3Vs in May 2009, and comments by various 
people at the validation workshop in July 2009. 
Funds were made available to the 3Vs, between January and March 2009, as advance 
payment for them to rent small shops to set up as general veterinary drug traders.  In the 
meantime they were to continue to receive $350/month salary from IK at least until August 
2009.  They also received free laptops, though they would also pay for their own fuel, 
motorcycle maintenance and phone airtime. 
 
The new shops were started not in the larger towns of the area but in relatively remote 
locations.  In them the 3Vs sold a full range of veterinary drugs including antibiotics, de-
wormers and anti-theilerials alongside Vectocid and trypanocides.  Not only did these shops 
look like enhancing the 3Vs‟ businesses, they also gained the favour of local leaders, 
particularly at sub-county level, who could use them as examples of successful political 
operation.  Relations with the District Veterinary Officers remained good.   
 
In October 2008 the 3Vs had originally sold their drugs mainly to other traders and to 
paravets already trained by various NGOs.  Over the following months quantities sold 
increased, and by July-August 2009 were dealing with a large and diversified customer 
base, of at least 100 direct and indirect customers, including at least 17 drugstores and 39 
private sprayers.  Many of the latter had been encouraged to go into business and form 
groups of farmers by the 3Vs.  But despite the establishment of the shops, the 3Vs in May 
2009 faced several serious problems and were notably pessimistic about their future.  One 
issue was the perceived high costs of running their businesses: rent, registration as drug 
dealers, and trading licenses. 
 
Ceva representatives had announced major increases in the prices at which the 3Vs could 
obtain Vectocid through their local agents.  A lot of this increase was due to devaluation of 
the Ugandan shilling against the US dollar, but this only explains some of the increase.  
Ceva justified the new prices by emphasising that Vectocid was a high-quality product, and 
that they continued to support the 3Vs and the marketing chain as a whole, and to pay for 
marketing materials.  Ceva‟s practical response to the 3Vs‟ protests was to offer franchises 
by which the 3Vs would sell no rival products to Vectocid, while no-one else would be 
allowed to wholesale Vectocid in the five districts.  In May 2009 they were distrustful of this 
offer and had not accepted it.  This price hike meant the 3Vs began to see a distinction 
between IK, whose representative continued frequent visits and continued to be flexible, and 
Ceva, who they saw as more profit-oriented and “tightening everything”.  
 
At the same time, the management arrangement between IK/Ceva and HHS ended in 
January 2009.  The 3Vs apparently rejected the proposed new arrangement and chose to 
procure drugs themselves from Kampala.  The result was that they could only buy for cash in 
small quantities and became trapped in a vicious circle of not obtaining bulk discounts, and 
spending disproportionate amounts of time and money on travel to and from Kampala, as 
often as twice a month.  By July 2009 the 3Vs were informally collaborating by taking it in 
turns to purchasing drugs for each other from Kampala, which decreased some transaction 
costs, but did not affect the bulk discount issue.  There were discussions among the partners 
about setting up fundamentally new supply chains for Vectocid. 
 
Most fundamentally, the ability of cattle-owners to purchase insecticides and drugs was 
declining.  Farmer livelihoods, always precarious and seasonally variable, had for many 
been devastated during the brutal insurgency carried out by the Lord‟s Resistance Army.  
Much of the population had been displaced to camps guarded by the Ugandan army (in 
some cases sleeping in the camps and travelling back to their villages to farm by day, but 
still with grave impacts on their livelihoods).  People in the camps had only began to return 
properly to farming in 2006, and the task of rebuilding livelihoods had not been easy.    
 
The 2008-09 long dry season was unusually long, and described by many as a drought.  In 
late 2008, strict quarantine regulations to restrict an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease 
were imposed across the region, closing down all legal trade in livestock and livestock 
products.  Farmers could not sell smallstock, as they had been used to, to meet cash needs, 
but had to sell food and use food stores.  By May 2009 they had very little money to buy 
animal drugs.   
 
These factors have been described as “unforeseen” relative to the drafting of the 3Vs‟ 
business plans in early 2009.  However, the FMD quarantine had been in place for several 
months, and drought has to be regarded as a structural feature of farming in these 
environments, so it is probably fairer to say that these factors of smallholder vulnerability 
were bracketed out of the business-planning process, rather than unforeseen by it.  
 
As a result of all these problems, by May 2009 the 3Vs were highly uncertain about their 
future, and could not envision become self-sustaining businesses without the salaries from 
IK (which were only guaranteed until August).  Some mentioned two or three years as the 
time horizon within which they would need support.  The possible alternative of taking 
commercial loans to build their businesses appeared to be closed because all available 
credit lines had stringent requirement for collateral such as buildings.  One response of the 
3Vs was to sell increasing amounts of other cheaper acaricides, especially Amitix (amitraz) 
which is not effective against tsetse.15  More generally, the 3Vs were concerned with the 
need for better communication, and increased “clarity and transparency” within the 
initiative.16 
 
The leading role of both IK and Ceva in the Stamp Out Sleeping Sickness Campaign has 
had two important implications, one positive and one negative, and possibly a second.  
Firstly, the way the campaign was run was striking in its flexibility.  Stakeholders were 
unanimous in agreeing that the campaign was very different in this respect to what it would 
have been like under traditional donor funding – with logframes and the like.  Activities could 
be improvised as needs arose and understandings became clearer.  Especially in the phase 
of supporting the 3Vs, fundamental objectives were left hazy until the 3Vs had been in the 
field almost six months.   
 
This flexibility was definitely a strength in allowing a period of “testing the market”, followed 
by a switch to promotion of the 3Vs as businessmen.  But the apparent lack of a long-term 
commitment to that promotion (and the apparent divergence of the aims of IK and Ceva) has 
been perceived by the 3Vs themselves as a serious source of uncertainty, which is itself 
constraining the development of their businesses in ways that also foster trypanosomiasis 
control.  
 
The second implication of the leading role of the private sector reiterates a theme form the 
other two case studies, about teaching and learning.  Discussion of the SOS campaign has 
been shot through with the ideas of educating, training or teaching farmers, and that of 
expertise.   The IK representative17 and Maudlin (nd) have both referred to the 
distinctiveness of the fact that IK has brought its own private-sector expertise to the 
campaign.  IK is also proud to have introduced the private-sector expertise of INSEAD to the 
campaign, and plans to build further links with INSEAD.  The IK News article on the 
campaign (Issue 17, Autumn 2006) uses the terms “training” and “teaching” eight times in 
around 1500 words.  A key passage reads:  
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 In interview 
“This project has a big teaching and training element.  We want to build awareness and 
transfer knowledge on the interaction of human and animal health as well as sickness 
prevention techniques.  Ultimately it is about helping people to do it for themselves.” 
 
The Ceva representative also referred to the education of consumers and traders in 
interview.  Education of farmers was raised in the case-study validation workshop and 
became one of three break-out themes.  Allied to this has been the concept of messaging, a 
key term of campaign rhetoric, and the subject of a separate but linked research project led 
by the University of Edinburgh, “Assessment of optimal channels of communication for 
effective message delivery on nagana and human sleeping sickness in Uganda” funded by 
the Wellcome Trust.18 
 
This education, training and messaging has overwhelmingly been conceived as education 
and training of farmers, or messaging to them.  There is undoubtedly much to teach farmers, 
and much thought needed on how to do so, but what has been a lot less apparent has been 
any idea of learning from or about farmers.19   
 
This point is not made in order to introduce a discussion of “indigenous knowledge” of 
trypanosomiasis or its treatment.  Where the absence of learning seems to have been 
important is in not understanding farmers‟ objectives in keeping cattle – some very surprising 
statements were made in the validation workshop about farmers keeping cattle only for 
status and not caring about their quality or productivity – and not understanding farmers‟ 
constraints.  The business plans drafted by the 3V vets with assistance from IK and an 
INSEAD trainer seem to have failed to take into account either farmers‟ gross pre-existing 
vulnerability stemming from a history of displacement, or the closure of livestock markets 
due to Foot and Mouth Disease, which was already in force, or the possibility of drought, 
which is well known to be not so much an unpredictable disaster as a structural condition of 
agriculture in a semi-arid region.  Not taking account of such constraints on farmers‟ ability to 
pay for drugs may yet have profound implications for the sustainability of the 3Vs‟ 
businesses and of trypanosomiasis control. 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the three case studies.  Firstly, and this should 
not be obscured by the critical tone of much of this paper, there is a real potential for 
engaging the private sector in pastoral development, in ways that go beyond companies‟ 
short-term business interests, and appeal to what could be called “corporate social 
responsibility”.  The destocking activities of the Ethiopian livestock exporters, and the 
generous funding by IK and Ceva of trypanosomiasis control in Uganda, were both at the 
end of the day very positive interventions on a considerable scale.  Both stories demonstrate 
the decisiveness of the private sector at its best, and also its flexibility, to respond to 
circumstances and try new approaches in ways that development donors would find difficult.  
NGOs, CSOs, development donors and researchers can and should look for dialogue with 
the private sector. 
 
These activities are, and dialogues about new activities will be, undertaken from a mixture of 
motives, not of all of which will be articulated clearly by companies.  This should be neither 
surprising nor an obstacle to dialogue.  The literature on CSR, and the debates on “the 
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business case” (or differentiated business cases – Zadek 2001) provide ways of 
understanding these mixed motives.20   
 
It will be important not to assume that there is any straightforward or obvious relation 
between the prospects for useful CSR-type activities and the size, origin or level of formality 
of companies.  Our case studies above include two multinationals, a private equity company, 
and indigenous companies in two subsectors, one labelled progressive by the government, 
the other not.  The most effective action came from the “unprogressive” Ethiopian livestock 
exporters, small family firms who put cattle on trains rather than “add value”, and from the 
private equity company.  One of the world‟s best-known multinationals, by contrast, made 
elementary errors about supply chains and became mired in failure. 
 
However, all three case studies point to a tendency for the private sector to engage in one-
way, top-down communication processes, to educate, train and teach but resist the idea of 
learning.  The Ethiopian exporters took opportunities presented by development 
programmes to instruct pastoralists in the ways of international meat markets.  Nestlé tried to 
mould Fulani pastoralists into commercial dairy producers.  Neither showed any interest in 
trying to understand the rationality of pastoralists as they fitted livestock and milk sales into 
the task of maintaining multi-functional herds over cycles of drought.  The private sector 
players in Uganda taught and trained the 3V vets, and indirectly Teso and Lango cattle 
owners, trying to make them conscientious practitioners of scientific preventive animal health 
and modern business practices, but not acknowledging the profound vulnerability to shocks 
that made that so difficult. 
 
Suggestions that CSR activities are generically prone to these sorts of blindnesses are found 
in the literature.  Prieto-Carrón et al. (2006:984) ask whether “corporations are sufficiently 
equipped to take on community development roles that require „soft‟ social science skills of 
the kind normally used in aid management”.  Blowfield and Frynas (2005:507) claim that 
“stakeholder engagement” – a key concept of the private sector and CSR - “presents 
particular challenges in a developing-country context where factors such as language, 
culture, education and pluralistic values can all affect the process of negotiation and 
decision-making”.  As a result, companies may fall back on “learning” only from market 
signals and in other tightly-defined ways. 
 
These are very general questions, but they may become sharpened when private-sector 
bodies attempt to deal with developing-country livestock-keepers, pastoralists or others, who 
balance multiple and complex objectives when they keep livestock – direct consumption, the 
possibility of sales for cash, long-term security and insurance, and draft power (Kitalyi et al. 
2005).  The intersection of what is possibly an intrinsic trait of CSR with the complexity of 
pastoral systems severely limits the potential development contribution of CSR.   
 
I close on a theoretical and methodological point, but one important for further work on this 
topic.  Elsewhere (Morton 2010b) I have written of the advantages of taking an expanded 
view of “power” and “government” and the way they are exercised over pastoralists, quoting 
Dean and Hindess (1989: 8) on:  
 
a whole host of mundane and humble practices, techniques, and forms of practical 
knowledge which are often overlooked in analyses that concentrate on either political 
institutions or political thought. 
 
The study tours, incentives, training courses and business plans described in the above 
cases are just such “mundane and humble practices”, and the ways they are spoken about 
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are such “forms of practical knowledge”.  Detailed attention to these practices and 
discourses can help reveal what is happening when companies act in the name of CSR or 
development or both, and thus identify options for other forms of development based on 
dialogue and mutual respect, in which pastoralists can teach as well as being taught. 
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